Understanding bushfire risk, warnings and responses – lessons from the 2018 Reedy Swamp fire

Research into the 2018 Reedy Swamp fire finds that many people consider bushfire preparation as something that is undertaken when directly threatened by fire—not well in advance of an active threat. 

By Dr Josh Whittaker, Dr Katharine Haynes and Carrie Wilkinson from the University of Wollongong and the Bushfire and Natural Hazards CRC, Dr Matalena Tofa and Dr Mel Taylor from Macquarie University and the Bushfire and Natural Hazards CRC. This article was first published in Issue Three 2020 of Fire Australia.

How embers spread fire into built-up areas, the dangers of late evacuation, and the need to provide greater clarity in warning messages were three key findings from research conducted after the 2018 Reedy Swamp fire on the New South Wales south coast.

The research, which investigated community preparedness and responses by interviewing 120 people affected by the fire, was undertaken by the Bushfire and Natural Hazards CRC, the University of Wollongong and Macquarie University, and commissioned by the NSW Rural Fire Services (RFS).

Key questions addressed by the study related to people’s perceptions of bushfire risk, community planning and preparation, and their response to warnings and their experience in the aftermath. Importantly, the research found that many believe preparing for a bushfire involves action only when directly threatened by fire, as opposed to preparation activities that can be undertaken well in advance of an active fire threat. 

Based on the findings, the NSW RFS continues to review and refine its approach to public information and warnings, and the structure and content of warning messages. The
RFS is also piloting the use of Community Field Liaison teams to provide consistent messages and advice on the ground.

The fire

On Sunday 18 March 2018, the Reedy Swamp fire bore down upon the communities of Reedy Swamp and Tathra in the Bega Valley Shire on the NSW south coast. The fire destroyed 65 homes and 35 caravans and cabins. Around 700 residents were displaced on the day, as well as an unknown number of tourists and visitors to Tathra. No human lives were lost. 

A total fire ban was in place for the area on the day, with the severe fire danger conditions experienced being unprecedented for the area at that time of year.

What was found

Community perception of risk before the fire

Many residents within Tathra were not aware of the bushfire risk. People within the town had not considered that a bushfire could affect Tathra, or had not considered the potential for a bushfire to penetrate beyond the forest edge. As such, they had not adequately planned or prepared for bushfire. Residents with properties within or adjoining the forest tended to be more aware of the risks, and were therefore more likely to have taken action to plan or prepare. 

What actions people took to prepare

Levels of preparedness varied considerably among residents, with many describing preparation as something that is done when a fire is threatening, rather than actions taken in advance. Some residents appeared to have planned and prepared for last-minute evacuation, while those who had not planned to leave described a last-minute dash around their house, trying to collect items they considered important to take. 

How people became aware of the bushfire and how they reacted

Most people became aware of the fire by seeing or smelling smoke, or by communications with relatives, friends or neighbours. For some residents, knowledge of the fire caused concern and motivated preparatory or protective action. Others noted the presence of the fire but did not believe it was a threat to Tathra, and continued with what they were doing. 

Were people able to implement their fire plan?

Most of those who intended to leave were able to do so, but many reflected that they left too late. Some people who had not planned or prepared for bushfire stayed to defend their own and neighbours’ houses. Importantly, most of those who did have a plan were able to implement it. 

Information sought about the bushfire and how it was obtained and used

Many people sought information about the fire through direct observation of smoke, flames and the activities of neighbours and emergency services. The loss of electricity, mobile phone reception and issues relating to the broadcast of emergency information into the local area impeded the delivery of warnings, information and advice.

How did visitors to the area respond to the bushfire?

A range of local businesses were hosting non-residents when Tathra came under threat. All accommodation providers were able to alert their guests to the bushfire and instructed them to evacuate. Some evacuations occurred while the fire was in Tathra. Mandated evacuation plans and emergency procedures assisted the evacuation process.

Community expectations of warnings and information, particularly in known mobile phone coverage black spots

Most interviewees were aware of the limited mobile phone coverage in the Tathra and Reedy Swamp areas. Some had considered that they might not receive an SMS warning in an emergency, while others expected warnings and advice to be provided earlier, before power and communications infrastructure failed. People expected that local media would provide ongoing coverage of emergency warnings and information throughout the fire. Some interviewees suggested that a siren or klaxon should be installed to alert people of an emergency when telecommunications infrastructure fails.

The effectiveness of warnings and the resulting actions taken

Many did not receive warnings or received warnings late, leading to uncertainty and confusion about whether, when and where to evacuate. Those who received warnings found them useful in confirming the threat posed by the fire and the need to take action. Others who received a warning advising them to seek shelter were unsure what it meant.

Did the time of year influence how people responded?

Some interviewees had been aware that the day of the fire was forecast to be a day of severe fire danger. Others expressed surprise that such a destructive bushfire could occur in mid-March. A small number of interviewees discussed their belief that the bushfire season over-influenced their preparedness and response.

Community experiences in the aftermath of the bushfire

People experienced a range of common issues related to evacuation centres, post-fire communication, media, politicians’ conduct, safety issues, and concerns about the local environment. While most were impressed with the services provided at the evacuation centre, others were uncomfortable with the media presence. People were distressed to find out that their houses had been destroyed via media reports and images, rather than official communication.

How do people intend to plan, prepare and respond to bushfires in the future?

Interviewees reflected on specific changes they would make to their properties. Many who left at the last moment said they would leave earlier in a future bushfire. Those who stayed to defend identified the need for better equipment and resources, and several who evacuated said they would not leave in the future. Interestingly, some said they would remain within the fire-affected area only to avoid the inconvenience of being prevented from returning.

Opportunities to increase community awareness and preparedness

Bushfires like the Reedy Swamp fire present valuable learning opportunities for people in bushfire risk areas. This research presents opportunities to increase awareness and understanding of the risks to coastal communities. Consideration should be given to including experiences and learnings from such fires in community engagement and education materials.

The study suggests a need for more education and advice about the dangers of late evacuation and a need for greater dialogue and clarity of warning messages. It also shows the opportunities to increase community awareness and preparedness in built-up areas through clearer communication of the potential for embers to carry fire into these locations—well beyond what many believe to be the interface between forests and houses.

Importantly, community experiences of the devastating 2019–20 fire season are now being studied. This new research along with the Reedy Swamp fire research, is building on previous NSW RFS-contracted research undertaken by the CRC for major bushfires in the Blue Mountains, Coonabarabran and Southern Highlands areas, as well as for fire agencies in Victoria, Tasmania, WA and SA.

Find out more about this research here.