Sydney RAF
Residential mobility and disasters

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Social connections

“The community’s participation and involvement during ongoing recovery is integral to building trust and engagement. Strong social infrastructure, such as social connectedness, social networks, social capital, social identity and attachment processes has an important role in facilitating emergency response and recovery”

“Social capital refers to resources (such as information, aid, financial resources, and practical, emotional and psychological support)”

- Framework for Psychosocial Support in Emergencies.

Ministry of Health, 2016
People move

What effect does this have on social structures and social capital, and vice versa?
How do we reconcile the demands of an effective social order with opportunities of mobility?

Where mobility can be seen as both a blessing and a curse, as an opportunity for personal liberty which is linked to degradation of social stability.
Migration data are hard to reconcile

FIGURE 2  League table coverage by type of data

Data Type
- one-year (transition, event, last move)
- five-year (transition, last move)
- one-year and five-year
- missing data
NZ, Aus, USA, 5 years data
A closer look at 5 year data
1 year data

FIGURE 4 One-year ACMIs by country, ranked

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>ACMI (%)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
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1 year data - closer look

**FIGURE 4** One-year ACMIs by country, ranked

- Iceland
- Finland
- Zambia
- Kenya
- Denmark
- United States
- Australia
- Sweden
- Canada
- Norway
- Tanzania
- Switzerland
- United Kingdom
- Belgium
- Germany
- Netherlands
- Sudan
- Colombia
- Austria
- Greece
- Ireland
- Japan
What do we know?

- Measured over 5 years, migration intensities varied from highs of 50%+ in NZ and South Korea, to lows of <6% in Egypt and India.
- Over 1 year, migration intensity in Iceland is x20 level in Macedonia.
- High variation but patterns emerge:
  - North America and Australasia global poles of high residential mobility.
  - Low migration intensities common across much of Asia, with exceptions of South Korea and Japan.
  - Europe and Latin America, more variation but clear spatial gradient NW to SE, Andes spine high, declining to E and N into Central America.
  - Fragmented evidence in Africa.
What do we know?

- Chelsea, Massachusetts - 1914; 20% left city, 20% moved within city
- USA 1995-2000; 50% movement of population; between 2005-2010, 35% of Americans changed residence in search of better housing, employment, and economic conditions
- Yet, a big proportion did not move; associated with stable white collar jobs, and more links to formal organisations
- Those that did move; associated with escaping changes in financial circumstances
- Recent evidence: mobility reduced by later departure from parental home
Digging into 2007 NZ data

- 829,500 out of 3,218,800 of survey population in 2007 moved at least one in two years (26%)
- 33% aged 20-29
- 68% of non-movers ages 30-69
- (Bogue, 1959 - “all residential mobility is primarily a phenomenon of late adolescence and early maturity”)
- People who moved more likely to have had change in living arrangements.
- Almost all the non-movers were living with same person as two years ago (98%)
- Almost half of movers and non-movers had income of $30k or less
- However, non-movers with income between $10-20k = 22% v 17% for people who moved
- Bigger proportion of movers in NZ have income $20k-50k compared with non-movers (41% v 35%)
- Movers: 42% had 5 or more homes in last 10 years; 30% had lived at previous home for less than one year
- Non-movers: 45% had one home in last 10 years, 26% had two homes
Other variables of importance

- Personal freedom
- Housing market variables
- Industry composition
- Occupational mix
- Levels of education

- Civil unrest
- Household income
- Transportation infrastructure
- Employment
- Satisfaction with current arrangements, or cost-benefit analysis
Differences to attend to

- Long-distance vs local movement; migration vs mobility
- Push and pull factors
- Life-cycle moving - move less as we get older, though that might change
How do disasters disrupt this?

- Movement as a household coping mechanism triggered by lack of resources, presence of kin, belief that land can be reclaimed - no faith in permanent solution

- Permanent move option for those who can afford to do so, or have other resources

- Desire to move as result of environmental hazard necessary but not sufficient to trigger actual move
Trade-off?

- People may accept negative yet stable state rather than face stress of move associated with changing

- Also, protected if have white collar job and embedded in social structures - seems to be less so for blue collar

- (what about new collar?)

- Some evidence that outsider perceptions of environmentally hazardous residential contexts differ from those residing within
Push and pull factors

- Hazard related property damage - affects all, but minorities tend to move more when you take out effects of hazards - structurally weaker housing, more likely to become uninhabitable.

- More consistent contributor than hazard frequency or crop damage

- Also, minorities’ difficulty in accessing and navigating bureaucracy post-disaster. More likely to find themselves moving from one place to another

- In-migration vs out-migration - may also see ‘co-ethnic’ pull

- LESS from long-term employment in recovery related jobs

- MORE from enhanced access to familiar jobs in new settings
Psychological aspects of residential mobility

Fig. 1. A psychological model of residential mobility and its outcomes. Solid lines indicate links that have received empirical support; dotted lines indicate links that have not yet been investigated.
Strength of ties

- Minor crisis; more likely to get help if you have broad, weak ties than those who have deep, narrow ties
- Major crisis; deep ties have advantage here, but only when residential mobility is low
- Cost of helping is large in major crisis
- Also friendship strategies are worth investigating
Mobility

- ‘Professional’ attitudes towards relationships
- Duty-free vs duty-based relationships
- Mobile society - primary sense of identity is personal self
- Negatively linked to individual well-being (esp if introverted)
- Self-esteem and verification of personal self predict wellbeing (social media ...) in a mobile society
- Verification of collective self predicts well-being in residentially stable communities and societies
What happens when community and personal interests no longer align?

Mobility, relationships and communities
Community / personal resilience
Combinations

Community - UP
Personal - UP
(water storage)

Community - DOWN
Personal - UP
(moving)

Community - UP
Personal - DOWN
(levy to strengthen)

Community - DOWN
Personal - DOWN
(can’t buy food)
Mobility

My dad didn't riot. He got on his bike and looked for work

— Norman Tebbit —
Moved 18 times in 9 years
Mobility and disposability

- The concept of object disposability
- Personal history of residential mobility predicts a willingness to dispose of objects - increases willingness to cut social ties? It seems so ...
- It seems that object disposability may predict relationship disposability
- If we communicate risk such that people with history of residential mobility decide to move, what does that do to relationships?
- What about ‘community resilience’?
Combinations

Community - UP
Personal - UP
(water storage)

Community - DOWN
Personal - UP
(moving)

Community - UP
Personal - DOWN
(levy to strengthen)

Community - DOWN
Personal - DOWN
(can’t buy food)
Community

- Residents of stable neighborhoods are more engaged in community affairs.

- What can we learn about those who are residually mobile and their relationship strategies to help them contribute to community affairs and disaster resilience?

- For example, ‘residually mobile’ people in experiment accept help from strangers more. However, those who were ‘residually stable’ seemed to help more.

- How can we engender ‘community’ for those who are mobile?
Research with BNHCRC

- Does a history of residential mobility predict if people will move in a disaster, or if disaster risk increases?
- What sorts of feelings and behaviours are elicited when you draw attention to disaster risks compared with when you don’t?
- Also:
  - How does it affect the social capital of those left behind?
  - How does it impact on the social capital of the community that is moved into?
Methods

- Experimental scenario manipulation - recruited and conducted online using Amazon Mechanical Turk Platform
- Use pre-existing data sets such as census data to ensure representative sample drawn to establish potential panel to go back to - repeated measures
- Enable comparisons across and within groups e.g. those with history of childhood residential mobility vs adult residential mobility
Proposed Study 1

- Confirming the relationship between object disposability and relationship disposability
- Using, and comparing between NZ and Au samples
- Age, Gender, Willingness to Dispose Inventory, Big-5 personality inventory and other control co-variables
Proposed Study 2

• What is the influence of residential history on the relationship between object and relationship disposability?

• Is there a critical period for residential mobility where it may have a greater impact if, perhaps, residential mobility history started in childhood as opposed to adult years?

• Is there an age cohort effect?

• Correlational design
Proposed Study 3

- Experimental design

- Develop a ‘disaster mobility’ prime encompassing hazard x risk exposure

- Not exactly the same as a personal history of mobility, but likely to evoke some of the thoughts and feelings surrounding this experience

- Oishi (2012) found that mobility prime can temporarily put people in an analogous mindset as they would have chronically due to a history of frequent moves
Thank you

Any questions?

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