Navigating authority and legitimacy when 'outsider' volunteers co-produce emergency management services

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Abstract

This paper examines the thorny issue of authority and legitimacy in relation to 'outsider' emergency volunteering within the context of the community resilience policy agenda. Outsider emergency volunteering is any volunteering that: a) aims to assist communities in any aspect of disaster preparedness, response, relief and recovery, and b) is not registered with or under the direction of a formally recognised emergency management organisation (EMO). Hence, it does not have clear grounds to establish its authority and legitimacy within the formal authorising environment of the emergency management sector.

The paper draws on co-production theory to examine how three important challenges for establishing authority and legitimacy were navigated in four Australian cases of co-production involving outsider emergency volunteering. Given the rise of resilience in disaster policy and the changing nature of volunteering in modern society, the very formalised and defined foundations of authority and legitimacy in emergency management will need to soften and expand to become more networked and distributed. The four cases described here shed some light on what softer and expanded foundations for authority and legitimacy can look like and the processes that can support them in the emergency management context.

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Introduction

In Australian emergency management, issues of authority, legitimacy, responsibility and accountability have come to the fore in recent years. Authority has always been a central pillar in emergency management, given its militaristic, command-and-control roots (Quarantelli, 1987). Yet, the established foundations of authority are shifting as the emergency management environment and participants are changing under the influence of community resilience and shared responsibility policy agendas and changing public expectations (Lukasiewicz, Dovers, & Eburn, 2017; McLennan and Handmer, 2012).

Discourses around authority and legitimacy in emergency management are particularly fraught, and fascinating, in connection to what we might call 'outsider' disaster or emergency volunteering.[1] Australia has up to 500,000 affiliated emergency management volunteers, who underpin the country's formal emergency management capability across preparedness, response, relief and recovery (Commonwealth of Australia, 2016). These volunteers are 'insiders' of the established emergency management system by virtue of their association with formally recognised governmental or non-governmental emergency management organisations (EMOs). We define EMOs as those organisations that have recognised roles in the formal emergency management plans and standard operating procedures that structure emergency management activity in Australia. Examples of volunteer-involving EMOs are the state and territory fire and emergency service agencies, and not-for profit relief organisations such as the Australian Red Cross.

Assistance given to communities before, during and after emergencies and disasters has never been confined to the paid and voluntary workforces of these recognised EMOs, however. The large and long-standing body of research on citizen response to disasters and convergence on disaster sites stands as testament to this (e.g. Helsloot and Ruitenberg, 2004; Whittaker, McLennan, & Handmer, 2015). In this paper, we use the term 'outsider emergency volunteering' to refer to *any* volunteering that: a) aims to assist communities in any aspect of disaster preparedness, response, relief and recovery, and b) is *not* registered with or under the direction of an EMO. In other words, outsider emergency volunteers are any volunteers who do not derive authority to deliver emergency management services to communities through their association with an EMO. Therefore, their legitimacy as service providers may be unclear, denied or contested by either governments or communities.

This paper examines the thorny issue of authority and legitimacy in relation to outsider emergency volunteering. It shares insights from four Australian case studies of outsider emergency volunteers co-producing emergency management services with system 'insiders': the paid and voluntary workforces of established EMOs. Public services are co-produced when citizens or other civil society actors are directly and actively involved in the production

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[1] Following common terminology in Australia we use the term 'emergency' in preference to 'disaster', e.g. emergency management, emergency volunteering.

or execution phase of public policy through the design and delivery of public services at the level of specific programs (Ostrom, 1996). Not surprisingly, the issue of authority is also a central concern in co-production theory. This paper therefore draws on this theory to embed and interpret insights about authority from the four case studies.

We note that co-production and the closely related concepts of co-management, co-creation, and co-design have been the focus of study across a range of research fields, including urban planning and urban administration (e.g. Sharp, 1980), natural resource management (e.g. Berkes, 2009), and social policy (Needham, 2008), to name a few. For this paper, we draw from the deep body of research on the co-production of general public services within the field of public administration research, rather than from the bodies of research focused on specific sectors.

Outsiders and insiders in Australian emergency management

'Outsider emergency volunteer' is not common terminology in disaster and emergency management research or practice. A more common term used to refer to volunteers not under the direction of formal emergency management organisations is 'unaffiliated' (also 'non-affiliated', 'unofficial', see Whittaker, et al., 2015). However, this term is overly narrow and unclear for the purposes of this paper. It is applied almost exclusively to refer to volunteering that occurs during an emergency event. Moreover, it is used differently by different authors. Some contrast 'spontaneous unaffiliated volunteers' with the 'affiliated' volunteers who are registered and active with EMOs.[2] Others use the term 'affiliated' to refer to *all* formal volunteers during emergency events, irrespective of whether or not their organisation has a recognised role in emergency management.[3] By the first use, 'unaffiliated volunteers' are any formal and informal volunteers who respond to disasters who are not associated with a recognised EMO. By the second use, 'unaffiliated volunteers' is synonymous with 'informal volunteers' in the context of emergency response and relief.

The distinction between these uses matters, because it leaves a grey area in between 'affiliated' and 'unaffiliated' that is filled by volunteers with extending organisations (see Dynes, 1970). These are community sector and private organisations that, while having no prior involvement in emergency management, broaden their activities into the sphere of emergency management when a need arises for their communities or beneficiary groups (e.g. an emergency event occurring or a risk increasing). As 'outsiders' to the emergency management system, extending organisations can also find themselves needing to navigate challenges for establishing authority and legitimacy of their volunteers as providers of emergency management services (see for example, Dynes and Quarantelli, 1970; Johansson, Danielsson, Kvarnlöf, Eriksson, & Karlsson, 2018).

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[2] E.g. "the literature commonly talks about two types of volunteers: affiliated volunteers defined as those associated with organizations and trained to operate in a disaster setting, and unaffiliated volunteers seen as those who act spontaneously and are not associated with any recognized disaster response agency" (Strandh and Eklund, 2017, p.2).
[3] E.g. an "individual who is not affiliated with an existing incident response organization or voluntary organization but who, without extensive preplanning, offers support to the response to, and recovery from, an incident" (International Organization for Standardization, 2017, p.1)

Outsider emergency volunteering is something of a double-edged sword for EMOs. On one hand, it is an avenue for building community resilience and shared responsibility, thus advancing two of the central policy goals in Australian emergency management. Within Australian emergency management, the idea of community resilience is associated with: "functioning well under stress, successfully adapting to change, being self-reliant, and having social capacity and support systems" (COAG 2011, p.5). On the other hand, particularly in the context of emergency response, outsider emergency volunteering may represent a potential risk for the safety and wellbeing of the volunteers, communities and first responders, and effectiveness of the response effort (Barraket, Keast, & Newton, 2014). It also requires resources and coordination effort, and concern is often raised that it will divert these away from the trained EMO response (Whittaker, et al., 2015).

Importantly for the topic of this paper, outsider emergency volunteering also represents a weakening of control for EMOs. This latter point brings into focus an unresolved conundrum in emergency management with the rise of community resilience. Community resilience and shared responsibility present challenges to the traditional foundations of authority and public accountability in emergency management, given that "communities need to be empowered to take shared responsibility for coping with disasters." (COAG, 2011, p.2). As Helsloot and Ruitenberg (2004) note, "organisations which are based on the paramilitary model have difficulty incorporating volunteers, because they do not fit into the rank or authority structure" (p.105). Under a community resilience policy agenda "there is widespread pressure to transform command and control, hierarchical models of authority and management in to more networked and distributed approaches to policy leadership" (Bach, Kaufman, & Dahns, 2015, p.322). The implications of this potential shift in the authorising environments for Australian emergency management and community resilience have yet to be fully examined.

Navigating challenges for authority and legitimacy in collective co-production

Drawing from the foundational co-production theory of Elinor Ostrom (1996), we identify three important authorising environments that need to be navigated to establish the authority and legitimacy of outsider emergency volunteers as citizen-volunteer coproducers alongside the paid staff and volunteers of EMOs. The first is the *internal authorising environment,* which is the space within which co-producers negotiate and share contribution to, and influence over, the service delivery process and its outcomes. The second is the e*xternal governmental, or formal, authorising environment,* and the third is the *external community, or beneficiary, authorising environment*. These environments are overlapping and interact in ways that can complicate authority and legitimacy.

This paper focuses on examining the ways that three key challenges for navigating these authorising environments when outsider emergency volunteers are involved in coproduction. The first challenge is building credible commitment between co-producers within the internal authorising environment (Ostrom, 1996). This refers to the need for co-producers to establish trust, shared goals and a sense of mutual obligation and accountability between them. It underpins the legitimacy of collective co-production and it is recognised as one of the foundational conditions for its success.

The second challenge is establishing authority and legitimacy within both of the external authorising environments *at the same time*. Sources of governmental and community authority may be the same, or they may be different and even conflicting (Bryson, Sancino, Benington, & Sørensen, 2017). When outsider emergency volunteers are involved, it is not difficult to imagine scenarios where co-production might have high social legitimacy but struggle to gain legitimacy within the established emergency management system (e.g. Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2003, p.109).

The third challenge of focus in this paper is navigating external governmental authority whilst avoiding what has been called the 'hedgehog's dilemma'. The hedgehog's dilemma concerns the impact of government on citizen and voluntary initiatives, where the closer governments get to citizen and voluntary initiatives, the more likely they are to "kill or mutate" them (Brandsen, 2016, p.349). In the case of citizen-led or community organisation-led initiatives, dilemmas often arise related to freedom, control, and independence (Brandsen, 2016). Indeed, civic or voluntary initiatives "often face a central dilemma between: modifying their behavior to work with the state, thereby increasing their opportunities to receive support (for example funding, political legitimacy); and the freedom of working at a distance from the state without such support" (Van Meerkerk, 2016, p.470).

Insights from four Australian cases

In the remainder of this paper, we show how the above three challenges were encountered and addressed in four Australian cases of collective co-production involving outsider emergency volunteers (see Table 1). There are two levels at which co-production occurs within these cases: the level of individuals (i.e. outsider emergency volunteers interacting with emergency management insiders to deliver services) and the level of organisations (i.e. outsider volunteer-involving organisations interacting with EMOs to deliver services). In three of the cases community sector organisations (CSOs) that are not traditionally involved in emergency management were involved as co-producers. The first two cases were community-led, while the last two involved volunteering that was led or co-ordinated by 'outsider' CSOs. The paper includes four different cases in order to show some key commonalities in how authority and legitimacy were navigated across emergency management contexts and phases for different forms of outsider emergency volunteering.

<Insert Table 1 here>

These were qualitative case studies, with data collected primarily through semi-structured key informant interviews (see Table 1). Interviewees were selected due to the depth of their insider knowledge of each case, with a focus on ensuring both emergency management outsiders and insiders were interviewed in each instance. Exact numbers of interviewees and interviewee types varied for each case due to the specific characteristics of each.

Interviews were recorded, transcribed verbatim, and returned to interviewees for checking. Interview data was then coded and thematically analysed using NVivo qualitative analysis software (e.g. Cope, 2010). Quotes from interviews are used in this paper to illustrate key themes. These are indicated below with quotation marks and italics, and interviewees are

referred to by their co-producer role and a unique 'case-participant' ID (e.g. public official, BRW02].

Be Ready Warrandyte

Be Ready Warrandyte was an award-winning, community-led bushfire preparedness project undertaken in a locality with an extreme bushfire risk in south-eastern Australia (McLennan, 2018). It was instigated by community members, with support from a local EMO-affiliated volunteer, all of whom were concerned at the lack of bushfire risk awareness and preparedness in the local area in the aftermath of the catastrophic Black Saturday bushfires in Victoria in February 2009. One of the fires came within 15 kilometres of the Warrandyte area (Teague, McLeod, & Pascoe, 2010). In response, the instigators sought and secured funding through a state government grant program in conjunction with the Warrandyte Community Association (WCA) for a community-led project to improve bushfire risk awareness and household planning. The WCA is an active resident group that promotes community life and defends the character and heritage of the Greater Warrandyte area.[4] Prior to the Black Saturday bushfires, it was not involved in emergency management.

The project was run by a project committee chaired by the President of the WCA. Members included outsider emergency volunteers – WCA and other ad hoc community volunteers, and public officials and affiliated emergency management volunteers from the state government's Country Fire Authority (CFA) and staff from two local governments. With the support of paid, professional project managers from the local community, the committee designed and implemented a range of well-received awareness-raising events, tools, and resources tailored to the local community's social and risk contexts.

Maintaining credible commitment through a shared public value goal and capable leadership

With respect to navigating the internal authorising environment, a key insight from the Be Ready case is the importance of commitment to a shared public value goal and capable leadership for building a high degree of credible commitment. As one participant said, "*Nobody has any vested interest, politically or practically or economically in the outcome. […] ultimately the goal is a really clean, clear, authentic and real goal*" [project manager, BRW10]. Ongoing face-to-face interaction was also emphasised as important for underpinning this commitment. This was significantly challenged throughout the project, however, by high-turnover of public officials: "*you lose the skills and the relationships and the rapport that someone's built with this community group and you've got to start it all over again*" [public official, BRW02].

Capable community leadership underpinned credible commitment amongst the coproducers. The community volunteers on the committee were especially strong and capable co-production leaders, particularly the Chair. They were described by public officials and project managers as: "*very strong people*" [public official, BRW09] who "*know what they're doing*" [WCA volunteer, BRW11], and "*incredibly smart, clever, creative, and community-minded people*" [project manager, BRW10]. Public officials had a high degree of trust in them, and

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[4] See https://warrandyte.org.au/about/

they had few concerns about public accountability because of the committee's adherence to good governance and the use of professional, paid project management support for processes like formally documenting meeting minutes.

Grounding external authority in an established community organisation

Regarding the challenge of establishing external authority with both government and beneficiaries at the same time, an important insight from the Be Ready case is the significant role that established community organisations can play in enabling this. In this case, the WCA was a long-standing community organisation that was respected in the local community and had strong, established relationships with local government. It was therefore able to establish authority within both of the key external authorising environments at the same time. With respect to community authority, the generally wide acceptance of the WCA as a legitimate community voice was an important factor contributing to the legitimacy of the Be Ready project: "*The WCA component has been important [...] The ability to bring into the Be Ready Warrandyte environment the broader views of the Warrandyte community and to do that with gravitas and some authority has been really important*" [project manager, BRW10]. This high substantive representativeness of community views and priorities through the WCA's broader engagement in the community assuaged concerns raised by some participants about the lack of descriptive representativeness of the community volunteers involved, particularly regarding gender and age, but also with respect to residency and awareness of local bushfire risk.

The hedgehog's dilemma: trade-offs for public value benefits and capable leadership

With respect to the hedgehog's dilemma of balancing government support with independence, the Be Ready committee chose to forgo some independence in order to benefit from working closely with public officials. Importantly, the benefits of doing this extended beyond access to funding to include expertise, assistance in working with the established systems, and also increasing the credibility of the project in the local community. There was also recognition, however, that meeting government funding requirements had limited the project's activities: "*we had to tow the CFA line whether we agreed with it or not*" [WCA volunteer, BRW04]. Thus, government involvement was seen by most of the community volunteers as important for advancing the primary public value goal for the project and for this reason the trade-offs it required were widely accepted: "*even though it was supposed to be an out of the box solution it did have to have some guidance and the levels of approval from the authorities. I think we got the balance right*" [EMO volunteer, BRW05].

Again, capable community leadership also enabled Be Ready to successfully navigate this dilemma. The community volunteers kept control of the project over time and negotiated differences in government and community priorities without losing the support of either public officials or citizen-volunteers, despite half the committee members being government representatives.

Community On-Ground Assistance (COGA)

The second community-based case study, Community On-Ground Assistance (COGA), was a citizen-initiated project that provided assistance to people who experienced property damage as a result of the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires in Victoria, Australia (Whittaker, McLennan, & Handmer, 2017). Immediately after the February 7 bushfires, a small group of Kinglake Ranges residents began to clear each other's properties of debris and dead and damaged trees. With funding from a faith-based humanitarian organisation, Samaritan's Purse, the group expanded and began to employ local people to help. Around the same time, a project began in Yarra Glen and Kinglake to provide skilled tradespeople to help repair fences, fell trees, and provide carpentry and building assistance. At first, these services were provided relatively informally. In 2010, the two groups combined to become the Community on Ground Assistance (COGA) project and partnered with CatholicCare, which acted as an auspice, to receive funding from the Victorian Bushfire Appeal Fund (VBAF). Public officials were primarily involved in COGA in the capacity of funders, regulators and administrators.

The project operated between September 2010 and June 2015, during which time it expanded service to people affected by bushfire throughout Victoria. It utilised a workforce of qualified, paid employees from the local community (some of whom began as volunteers) and corporate volunteers as well as volunteers from community groups and schools. Volunteers were needed from outside of the area because "*the volunteer fatigue was massive*" [participant, COGA03].

The hedgehog's dilemma and the erosion of credible commitment

The COGA case reflects key aspects of the hedgehog's dilemma of government involvement in citizen-initiated projects. Specifically, it shows how clashes between bureaucratic and community priorities and ways of working can erode credible commitment between coproducers.

Initially, there was strong support from public officials for the project, due to its demonstrated benefits for the people it assisted. The project also had considerable independence: "*In the beginning we had a fair bit of autonomy… It was very supportive, and it was very validating. It was: 'We trust you. We can see and hear the effect you are having on clients*" [participant, COGA01]. Over time, however, COGA participants became frustrated by their relationships with government agencies and public officials, which they felt became more controlling and less trusting. They believed that the focus of public officials shifted from helping clients to fulfilling bureaucratic requirements, as the immediacy of the recovery receded and regulatory controls tightened: "*as we moved away from the disaster and moved into a tighter regulatory framework it has been less about what the clients are saying – and you've seen our book, we've had fabulous responses from our clients. But none of that counts any more. What it is now about is protecting the panel from any media blowback and getting out of it, finishing*" [participant, COGA01]. Thus, their belief that public officials involved with the project were committed to the same public value goal diminished.

This case also raises the issue of the willingness of public officials, and their organisations, to relinquish control and influence over services with outsider emergency volunteers in settings

where there may be high public and political scrutiny, as was the case following the Black Saturday fires. As one public official supportive of community-based projects explained: "*We're trying to create an environment where we can foster and support that kind of stuff to happen, rather than what government tends to do which is shut that stuff down because we don't have control over it. We tend to prefer our community organisations and community people to be a bit more compliant and to do what we tell them to do*" [public official, COGA04].

Maintaining community authority and legitimacy of citizen-volunteers over time

This case also warns of potential difficulties for local community coproducers in maintaining community authority and legitimacy over time in a high emotion, post-disaster context. In the COGA case, there were a number of disputes about eligibility, which damaged relationships between participants and other members of the community: "*Living in a small community, there's two sides to that. One is that there are people who are receiving assistance who can be adversely affected themselves. They don't want people to know they're getting free help, that they need help. Quite proud… And the other one is that the Jameses get wind of the Smiths getting a hand, and how come they're not getting it? And a whole lot of judgement goes on*" [participant, COGA02].

In the case of COGA, these issues occurred and were noted by participants, but they were not frequent and so did not undermine the overall legitimacy of the project with the communities it assisted. However, the case does still speak to the balancing act that citizen-volunteers may have to engage in while coproducing recovery services in order to keep community authority over time. It suggests that citizen-volunteers may face challenges in maintaining community authority and legitimacy as they actively manage formal and practical requirements of service delivery, such as making calls on program eligibility.

EV CREW

The third case involved the coordination of spontaneous volunteering by a non-government organisations that acted as a broker between 'unaffiliated' volunteers and the authorised organisations helping communities in disaster relief and recovery (McLennan, Molloy, Whittaker, & Handmer, 2016). Emergency Volunteering and Community Response to Extreme Weather (EV CREW or Emergency Volunteering CREW) is a model for centrally coordinating spontaneous volunteers who respond during emergencies and assisting organisations to build capacity to manage spontaneous volunteers. It was developed and operated by Volunteering Queensland, a non-government organisation and the peak volunteering body in Queensland. Its development was in response to recognition that large numbers of people who wanted to help in the aftermath of major disaster events were, at that time, being systematically turned away by established EMOs, resulting in a lost opportunity to mobilise local skills, resources and capacity for emergency relief and recovery.

EV CREW is adapted from the business model of a recruitment agency. It involves Volunteering Queensland registering offers to volunteer from the public and live-matching registered people to requests for volunteers from organisations. The model has been used

since 2008, but by far its largest mobilization was in response to the historic Queensland floods of 2010/2011 (Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry, 2012). Over a period of a few weeks, Volunteering Queensland referred between 23,000 – 35,000 people to Brisbane City Council to help with the post flood clean-up in the state's capital. These volunteers formed a part of a massive volunteer post-flood clean-up effort that came to be known in the media as the 'Brisbane Mud Army' (Rafter, 2013).

Seeking out a place within the governmental authorising environment

A key insight of the EV CREW case was the way in which Volunteering Queensland first positioned itself within the governmental authorising environment by actively identifying and articulating a new, value-adding role for itself. Prior to this time, Volunteering Queensland was not an established player in the emergency management sector and understanding of the role that a volunteering peak body could have in the sector was low: "*It was a bit strange for them to see someone like me at a meeting talking about resilience. We never claimed to be disaster experts but we know community [...] VQ is about building community resilience to disasters and that's where VQ has something different to offer*" [CSO manager, CREW01]

In response, Volunteering Queensland leaders sought out and engaged with key emergency management stakeholders: "*Because of [his] work with stakeholders and the relationships that he was building with all those guys [EMOs], that link worked well in understanding the role Volunteering Queensland could have in building community resilience*" [CSO manager, CREW01]. As a result, Volunteering Queensland was endorsed by the State Human and Social Recovery Committee to coordinate registration and referral of spontaneous volunteers, and it now has a recognised role in the Queensland disaster management plan.

Legitimating spontaneous volunteering

Prior to EV CREW, spontaneous volunteers were primarily viewed as a nuisance and a risk within the Queensland, and Australian, emergency management community. Spontaneous volunteering was also perceived by some in the sector as a threat to the authority and reputation of established EMOs: "*Real dollars have gone into this resilience stuff but we haven't encouraged the organisations at the front line of it to understand this isn't a diminishment of their capacity.*" [public official, CREW02].

In this context, the EV CREW service provided a bridge between spontaneous volunteers and EMOs that had not existed previously. By first establishing itself as a legitimate player in emergency management, it opened up a new channel for volunteers to become temporarily affiliated with organisations that were authorised under state or local plans, such as the Brisbane City Council. Kendra and Watchendorf (2003) describe such temporary affiliation of spontaneous volunteers with EMOs in emergency events as "borrowing legitimacy". In this way, Volunteering Queensland was able to open carve out a new, space of legitimacy for spontaneous volunteers within the formal governmental authorising environment: "*CREW is a component of a range of volunteering and other options that exist… It isn't one or the other. More importantly it's how we build a structure that recognises and blends various people together better.*" [public official, CREW04].

Today, spontaneous volunteering has an increasingly legitimate place in Australian emergency management (AIDR, 2017; ANZEMC, 2015). The experience of EV CREW has been one important factor that has contributed to this shift. The demonstrated public value outcome of the EV CREW service has helped to open up a legitimate space for volunteering peak bodies and spontaneous volunteering in other Australian jurisdictions: *"[…] to have something that's proven and tested. […] without VQs experience and wisdom we would just lack confidence, I think, and, as you say, credibility"* [CSO manager, CREW07].

Pinery fire recovery volunteering

The final case study focused on outsider emergency volunteering with non-governmental CSOs that assisted communities in the aftermath of a bushfire in the state of South Australia in 2015 (Hall and Pinery Fire Community Action Group, 2017; Kruger, Whittaker, McLennan, & Handmer, 2017). The State Recovery Office (SRO), within the (then named) Department of Communities and Social Inclusion (DCSI), has primary responsibility for recovery in South Australia under the state emergency management plan (South Australian Government, 2016). Additionally, a Local Recovery Co-ordinator (LRC) is usually appointed by the State Premier upon advice from the SRO, as happened for the Pinery fire (South Australian Government, 2016).

The SRO and LRC also support and co-ordinate volunteer involvement in recovery, with a focus on coordinating effort to meet the needs of the impacted communities. To facilitate this, the SRO set up Memorandum's of Understanding (MOUs) with a number of organisations in the past in order to clarify and legitimate their roles. However, by the time of the Pinery fire, it had moved away from the need to maintain numerous, formal MOUs to rely instead on relationships that were well-established by this stage. In 2013 it set up a Stakeholder Forum for disaster recovery to facilitate these relationships by bringing key CSO representatives together to meet on a twice-yearly basis to discuss recovery processes and roles.

The CSOs involved in the recovery efforts following the Pinery fire included faith-based, environmental and social welfare organisations and groups that ranged from very formal to informal in their structures and volunteering models (Hall and Pinery Fire Community Action Group, 2017; Zimmerman, 2017). Some had formally recognised roles under the state emergency management plan while others did not. Local community leaders, churches and businesses also mobilised both formal and informal networks to support those impacted by the fire in a multitude of ways (Hall and Pinery Fire Community Action Group, 2017).

Credible commitment and 'soft' sources of government authority

This case again shows the importance of building credible commitment between insiders and outsiders of the emergency management system at both organisational and volunteer levels. The SRO and LRC were the primary sources of both internal and external authority as they worked with CSOs directly and provided them a place within the governmental authorising environment. An invitation to participate in the SRO's disaster recovery Stakeholder Forums was one, softer form of governmental authority for CSOs to participate in disaster recovery. Notably, the SRO also reached out to include volunteer-led organisations that have more

recently become involved in emergency relief and have less formalised volunteer models, for example Blazeaid, Samaritans Purse, and Shoeboxes of Love.

In this case too, high turnover of government staff in various agencies on the ground was identified as a challenge to the sustainability of credible commitment over time: "*So one of our dilemmas is that, inevitably, government is going to be involved in recovery committees, [...] Part of the dilemma is, people get promoted. So even if they wanted to, they can no longer fulfil their function, they don't always have their successor already boned up, so you get someone who has to step in and learn from scratch*" [CSO manager, PIN01].

Establishing external authority with demonstrated public value

For those CSOs without formal roles under state plans, having demonstrated public value outcomes was a key basis for establishing governmental authority through softer mechanisms. This was particularly evident in the need for newer groups to demonstrate their capability to achieve good public value outcomes to government before being fully accepted as legitimate players: "*The recovery sector staff were very sceptical. It was about three months in … We had some good outcomes and the staff at that point suddenly realised that we were another avenue to get into the psychological health of people*" [CSO manager, PIN01]. At the same time, CSOs could be denied government authority by the SRO and asked to stand down. Although, this was rare and focused on protecting communities and the effectiveness and efficiency of recovery.

When outsider emergency volunteers are not representatives of a community or previously known to it, they may similarly need to demonstrate commitment to a clear public value outcome to gain community or beneficiary authority. For example, some lesser known faith-based groups needed to establish that they were there to support communities in recovery and not to convert people to their faith. Working closely with local institutions that had good standing in the local community, such as local Churches, as well as with the SRO and LDC were other ways for groups coming from outside the local community to establish community authority.

Protecting autonomy and accessing governmental resources

Regarding the hedgehog's dilemma of government involvement (Brandsen, 2016), in general CSO leaders considered relationships with the state government, and particularly the SRO, favourably but some still felt a need to protect their autonomy in the face of government oversight: "*We know Recovery SA is in charge of projects. I said we're willing to take guidance and direction and for you to be comfortable with what we're doing. But we wouldn't surrender any of our autonomy, we just wouldn't*" [CSO manager, PIN05].

This case also highlights a different aspect of the dilemma of balancing independence and government involvement, as some CSO leaders felt that government's limited willingness and/or ability to share resources in recovery, including both funds and information, restricted the assistance they were able to provide. To a large extent it was recognised this was due to the more regulated and restrictive environment within which government agencies work: "*You have to feel sorry for the bureaucrats, they are very much constrained by the processes*

that are the day-to-day processes, and they have no ability to deal with the unique circumstances" [CSO manager, PIN01].

Conclusion

Given the rise of resilience in disaster policy and the changing nature of volunteering in modern society (McLennan, Whittaker, & Handmer, 2016), the very formalised and defined foundations of authority and legitimacy in emergency management will need to soften and expand to become more networked and distributed (cf. Bach, et al., 2015; Helsloot and Ruitenberg, 2004). The four cases described here shed some light on what these softer and expanded foundations for authority and legitimacy can look like and the processes that can support them in the emergency management context. Table 2 shows the range of ways that authority and legitimacy were established across the case studies, other than through formal, written emergency management plans and operating procedures.

<Insert Table 2 here>

The cases also reveal shared, underlying factors that supported the navigation of authority and legitimacy for co-production involving outsider emergency volunteers. These include capable leadership and ongoing relationships between coproducers at both organisational and individual levels (Dynes and Quarantelli, 1970; Schlappa and Imani, 2018). Commitment of all coproducers to a shared public value goal, as well as a demonstrated public value outcome are also important foundations for establishing authority and legitimacy. In particular, recognition that co-production creates a tangible public value outcome that would not be achieved by either government or citizen service delivery alone (e.g. complementarity Ostrom, 1996) increases the legitimacy of co-production with governments and communities. Moreover, if the commitment of coproducers to shared goals is questioned, as can occur when public officials are seen to prioritise bureaucracy over public value, this can seriously erode credible commitment.

Another underlying factor that supported successful navigation of authorising environments in these cases was the involvement of bridging organisations with high legitimacy in both governmental and community authorising environments (cf. Denters, 2016). Such organisations were instrumental in carving out and anchoring new spaces of legitimacy in the case studies. Three of the four cases examined here demonstrate different forms these spaces can take: Be Ready Warrandyte's community-led, multi-stakeholder project committee, Queensland's formalised State Human and Social Recovery Committee (Emergency Volunteering CREW case), the South Australian State Recovery Office's relatively less formalised Stakeholder Forum (Pinery fire recovery volunteering case).

A final observation arising from these cases concerns the placement and permeability of the boundaries between insiders/outsiders and affiliated/unaffiliated in Australian emergency management. Given the militaristic, command-and-control foundations of emergency management, it is not surprising that the preferred strategy for dealing with the involvement outsider emergency volunteers is to affiliate them with EMOs and thus legitimate – and control – their activities (e.g. Clark, 2016, p.21-2; Johansson, et al., 2018; Kvarnlöf and Johansson, 2014). However, recognition of the dangers of the hedgehog's dilemma, where

the closer governments get to citizen and voluntary initiatives, the more likely they are to "kill or mutate" them (Brandsen, 2016, p.349), provides a counter-warning for the Australian emergency management sector not to 'overdo' affiliation and formalisation of outsider emergency volunteering.

The cases reported here demonstrate that there are alternative ways to establish the authority and legitimacy of outsider emergency volunteers, other than requiring them to affiliate with EMOs. Indeed, many outsider emergency volunteers are 'outsiders' for a reason, and hence would resist such co-option by established EMOs. Further, at its core co-production works by creating synergy from combining the different, but complementary, inputs (e.g. resources, skills, knowledge, assets, networks and influence) of different kinds of coproducers in new and creative ways (Durose and Richardson, 2015; Ostrom, 1996). Denying alternative pathways to establish the authority and legitimacy of outsider emergency volunteers, and voluntary organisations, as coproducers runs the risk of eroding the synergy and public value outcomes that can be achieved when system 'insiders' and 'outsiders' coproduce emergency management services.

Tables

Table 1: Snapshot of the four co-production case studies

	Be Ready Warrandyte (BRW)	**Community On-Ground Assistance (COGA)**	**Emergency Volunteering CREW (EV CREW)**	**Pinery fire recovery volunteering (Pinery fire)**
Setting	Warrandyte & surrounds (Victoria)	Kinglake & surrounds (Victoria)	Brisbane (Queensland)	Adelaide Plains (South Australia)
Settlement type	Peri-urban	Peri-urban	Urban	Rural
Hazard	Bushfire/wildfire	Bushfire	Flood	Bushfire
Main hazard event	Victorian 'Black Saturday' bushfires, 2009 (*not directly impacted*)	Victorian 'Black Saturday' bushfires, 2009	Queensland floods, 2010/11	Pinery bushfire, 2015
Public service area	Bushfire preparedness and risk reduction	Bushfire recovery (long-term)	Flood recovery (short-term)	Bushfire recovery (short-term)
Initiator/s	Local community members & community organisation	Local community members	CSO	CSOs and state government
Main co-producers	**Outsider CSOs:** Warrandyte Community Association (WCA) **Outsider volunteers** – Community fireguard leaders, WCA members & project managers, ad-hoc project-based volunteers **Insiders:** Staff and volunteers of Country Fire Authority (CFA), 2 local governments	**Outsider volunteers/ local managers**: Community members, corporate volunteers **Insiders**: Staff of VBRRA, Anglicare, EACH (auspice)	**Outsider CSOs:** Volunteering Queensland (VQ) **Outsider volunteers:** General public, VQ volunteers, corporate volunteers **Insiders:** staff and volunteers of Brisbane City Council, recovery CSOs & community organisations	**Outsider CSOs**: Various faith-based, social welfare and environmental groups **Outsider volunteers**: formal, spontaneous, informal, casual with outsider CSOs **Insiders:** Staff of the State Recovery Office (SRO), local government, Local disaster coordinator, EMO affiliated volunteers
Primary data source	16 key informant interviews (10 volunteers, 2 local project managers, 6 public officials)	8 key informant interviews (5 project participants, 3 public officials)	12 key informant interviews (8 CSO managers, 4 public officials)	8 key informant interviews (6 CSOO managers, 2 public officials)

Table 2: Sources and spaces of authority and legitimacy (other than formal governmental plans)

Source/space of authority	Primary authorising environment	Case examples
Memorandums of Understanding (MOU)	Internal, External governmental	Pinery fire
Endorsement by emergency management committee or authorised person	External governmental	EV CREW, Pinery fire
Receipt of government funding	External government	Be Ready Warrandyte, COGA
Building trusted relationships with emergency management stakeholders	Internal, External governmental	Pinery fire, EV CREW, Be Ready Warrandyte
Creation of new governance spaces	Internal	Be Ready Warrandyte
Temporary affiliation with EMO (e.g. "borrowing legitimacy", see Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2003)	External governmental, External community	EV CREW
Demonstrated public value outcome	External governmental, External community	EV CREW, Pinery fire, COGA, Be Ready Warrandyte
Auspicing by an established NGO	External governmental	COGA
Trusted and community-embedded organisation	External governmental, External community	Be Ready Warrandyte
Good governance processes	Internal, External governmental	Be Ready Warrandyte

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