@article {bnh-2607, title = {Bushfire survival preparations by householders in at-risk areas of south-eastern Australia}, journal = {Australian Journal of Emergency Management}, volume = {29}, year = {2014}, abstract = {

While Australian state and territory governments devote considerable resources to combating bushfires, landowners and householders are increasingly expected to take responsibility for protecting their property and for their personal safety. All Australian states and territories have community bushfire safety programs in place which provide information and advice to householders about bushfire survival. This paper describes findings from a 2012 survey of 584 residents in at-risk areas of south-eastern Australia and describes generally low levels of planning and preparation for bushfires. Householder lack of planning and preparation for safe evacuation if threatened was especially concerning1.\ 

}, url = {https://ajem.infoservices.com.au/items/AJEM-29-02-05}, author = {Jim McLennan and Elliott, Glenn and Wright, Lyndsey} } @article {bnh-1745, title = {Predictors of south-eastern Australian householders{\textquoteright} strengths of intentions to self-evacuate if a wildfire threatens: two theoretical models}, journal = {International Journal of Wildland Fire}, volume = {23}, year = {2014}, month = {11/11/2014}, pages = {1176-1188}, chapter = {1176}, abstract = {

Householder evacuation in the face of a wildfire threat is the survival option advocated by fire agencies. However, late evacuation is common and has resulted in loss of life. The primary aim of this study was to investigate potential predictors of householders{\textquoteright} strength of intention to leave early in response to a bushfire threat warning. A survey of 584 residents of bushfire-prone locations in south-eastern Australia was conducted. Theory of planned behaviour (TPB) and protection motivation theory (PMT) were used to explore predictors of strength of householders{\textquoteright} intentions to leave, or to stay and defend following a bushfire warning. TPB was a useful predictor of strength of intention to leave, but PMT was not such a useful predictor of strength of intention to leave. Householder efficacy and self-characterisation were important contributors, whereas perceptions of severity and susceptibility to threat were not found to be significant contributors. Neither model performed well in predicting strength of intention to stay and defend. The findings are discussed in relation to community wildfire safety research and practice.

}, keywords = {Natural hazards, stay or go policy}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/WF13219}, url = {http://www.publish.csiro.au/?paper=WF13219}, author = {Jim McLennan and Sean Cowlishaw and Paton, Douglas and Beatson, Ruth and Elliott, Glenn} } @article {BF-4277, title = {Householders{\textquoteright} safety-related decisions, plans, actions and outcomes during the 7 February 2009 Victorian (Australia) wildfires}, journal = {Fire Safety Journal}, volume = {61}, year = {2013}, month = {10/2013}, pages = {175-184}, chapter = {175}, abstract = {This study examined decisions made by householders under wildfire threat. Data were obtained from interviews with survivors of severe wildfires in Victoria (Australia) on 7 February 2009 which killed 172 civilians and destroyed more than 2000 homes. Prior to this, Australian fire agency community wildfire safety policy was that residents should: {\textquoteleft}Prepare, stay and defend or leave early{\textquoteright}. Most of the 223 interviewees who stayed and defended did so because this was their wildfire safety plan, and they believed that they would be successful despite the predicted extreme fire danger weather. In 79\% of cases, defence was successful; for the remaining 21\% the house was destroyed and several lives were imperilled. Of the 216 who left for a safer location only 39\% said that this was their wildfire safety plan; for most, the action of leaving was triggered by realisation of the imminent threat posed by the fire; 36\% self-evacuated under hazardous conditions. The findings suggest that community wildfire safety programs should emphasize: (a) the risks associated with staying to defend a property; and (b) how householders should prepare in order to leave safely if a fire threatens.}, keywords = {Community wildfire safety, Decision making, Evacuation, Property defence, Risk perception, Wildfire survival}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.firesaf.2013.09.003}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S037971121300146X}, author = {Jim McLennan and Elliott, Glenn and Omodei, Mary and J Whittaker} } @article {BF-3339, title = {Householder decision-making under imminent wildfire threat: stay and defend or leave?}, journal = {International Journal of Wildland Fire}, volume = {online early}, year = {2012}, month = {July 2012}, abstract = {The study examined aspects of decision-making that distinguish between those who stay and defend their property and those who leave for an assumed safer location when a community comes under imminent threat from a severe wildfire. The data were obtained from field interviews with 49 survivors of the Murrindindi wildfire (Victoria, Australia, 7 February 2009) in which 38 people perished and that destroyed the small township of Marysville. Uncertainty about the level of threat was a major feature of the decision-making context in the period immediately preceding the impact of the fire. The majority of those who stayed and defended did so because they were committed to this plan of action. For most of those who left, the action of leaving was triggered by realisation of the severe threat posed by the intensity or location of the fire.}, doi = {10.1071/WF11061}, author = {Jim McLennan and Elliott, Glenn and Omodei, Mary} } @article {BF-3160, title = {Issues in Community Bushfire Safety: Analyses of Interviews Conducted by the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Research Task Force}, year = {2012}, month = {March 2012}, abstract = {1. Immediately following the 7 February 2009 Victorian bushfires the Bushfire CRC organised a multi-agency Task Force to investigate and report on four aspects of the fires: arson (in collaboration with Victoria Police); fire behaviour; building survivability and infrastructure; and human behaviour and community safety. This last involved interviewing a cross-section of survivors about their experiences. 2. A total of 552 field interviews were conducted, resulting in 496 usable and informative interview transcripts. The transcripts were analysed following coding of aspects of survivors{\textquoteright} accounts. This report describes findings in relation to issues of householder bushfire knowledge, planning, preparedness, decisions, actions, threats, and hazards. 3. The aim of the report is to inform fire and emergency services agencies about survivors{\textquoteright} beliefs, plans actions, and experiences which may have implications for current community bushfire safety policies, priorities, programs, and practices. 4. Survivors{\textquoteright} accounts covered eight fire complexes: Beechworth, Bendigo, Bunyip, Churchill, Horsham, Kilmore, Murrindindi, and Narre Warren. Of the 496 transcripts, 360 were from residents of isolated rural properties, 99 were from residents of rural towns, and 37 were from residents of bushland-urban interface (suburban) streets. 5. Bushfire survival plans: It is estimated that 81\% of those who planned to stay and defend had undertaken more than minimal long term preparation to do so, while 34\% of those whose plan was to leave safely had undertaken more than minimal long term preparation to do so. Overall, 6\% of survivors planned to {\textquoteleft}wait and see{\textquoteright} before committing to a course of action; 9\% had an unclear household bushfire plan; 70\% of bushland-urban interface survivors had no household bushfire plan. 6. Actions on the day: Of the 496 survivors, 8\% were not at home on 7 February 2009 by chance; 2\% were not at home by choice to be somewhere safer; 28\% left safely before impact of a fire; 16\% left under hazardous conditions; 36\% stayed and defended their home successfully; 9\% stayed and attempted to defend but were unsuccessful; 2\% sheltered in place passively. 7. Overall, less than one-third of those interviewed had undertaken a high level of long term preparation to implement their household bushfire survival plan. A little more than half of the bushland-urban interface residents had undertaken no preparation. 8. Although many of those interviewed did not provide information on awareness of fire danger weather, 50\% of those who did evidenced a high level of awareness of fire danger weather on 7 February 2009. However, these were all residents of isolated rural properties or towns: almost half of the bushland-urban residents were not aware of the predicted fire danger weather in relation to a potential threat to their property from a bushfire. 9. On five indicators of bushfire {\textquoteleft}readiness{\textquoteright} (long term preparation, awareness of fire danger weather, physical readiness for a possible bushfire, awareness of an approaching fire, and readiness to act upon knowledge of an imminent bushfire threat) residents of isolated rural properties described higher overall readiness levels than did residents of rural towns and bushland-urban interface residents{\textemdash}the latter described very low levels of readiness to survive a bushfire. 10. It seems that most residents of isolated rural properties had a reasonable level of awareness of bushfire risk in general, and had personalised this and undertaken long term property preparation to defend against bushfire which may have been adequate for {\textquoteleft}typical{\textquoteright} low to moderate intensity bushfires. 11. Most residents of bushland-urban interface dwellings did not understand themselves to be at-risk of bushfires, notwithstanding their proximity to bush or grassland. Residents of rural towns varied: some had an understanding of their risk similar to those who resided on isolated rural properties, some had an understanding similar to bushland-interface residents in relation to bushfire risk. Others had bushfire risk understandings intermediate between these. 12. There is some indication that those interviewees who stated an expectation that they would receive an official warning that their property was under threat, and/or that they would be given firefighting assistance had lower levels of general readiness to survive bushfires. 13. The most immediately useful sources of information for residents under bushfire threat were cues from the environment: smoke, flames, embers, sounds. 14. Most of those whose bushfire plan was to leave did so. Most of those who planned to stay and defend did so{\textemdash}however, 20\% decided to leave instead when they became aware of the intensity and/or proximity of the fire. Most of those whose {\textquoteleft}plan{\textquoteright} was to wait and see left, as did the majority of those who had no plan and most of those whose plan was unclear. 15. Most (80\%) of the homes which were defended actively survived, while 52\% of the homes not actively defended survived. 16. There was no compelling evidence that house survival was related to level of long term property preparation. 17. Compared with those who left, those who stayed and defended described higher levels of bushfire readiness in the form of: long term preparation; general knowledge of bushfires; awareness of predicted fire danger weather; physical readiness for a possible bushfire on the day; and awareness of an approaching fire. They were also less likely to report expecting a warning from authorities that their properties would be threatened by a bushfire. 18. Overall, those who stayed and defended were exposed to considerably higher levels of threat to life. However, 8\% of those who left were exposed to severe or extreme levels of threat when forced to take last resort shelter as a result of leaving at the last minute. 19. The major determinant of residents{\textquoteright} decisions to stay and defend was a prior commitment to this course of action, coupled with a belief that their preparations were adequate and that they were capable of defending successfully. For most of those who left, the decision to leave was a complex mix of neither intending nor preparing to defend, and triggering by information about: the proximity and intensity of the fire, the perceived threat posed by the fire, and concern for the safety of family members. 20. Almost two-thirds of those who stayed and defended reported that their efforts were compromised to a greater or a lesser degree by equipment failure{\textemdash}involving mostly water and power supply. Three quarters had no back-up plan in the event that defence failed and the house burned. 21. About one in five of those on their property on the day reported that the safety of pets and/or livestock was a factor in their decisions and actions. 22. One quarter of those on their property on the day indicated that a lack of official information and warnings about the fire potentially exposed them to greater risk. 23. It seems that many residents who choose to stay and defend are likely to: underestimate the potential severity of a bushfire attack; overlook vulnerabilities of the house structure; not take into account possible failure of equipment and physical capabilities; and not prepare for survival in the event that defence is unsuccessful and the house burns. 24. It seems that bushfire survival plans to leave safely are difficult for many at-risk householders to prepare for, commit to, and implement. Few are likely to relocate to a place of safety before there is some indication of an actual bushfire threat (not just a prediction of a total fire ban day), and many are unlikely to leave in the absence of a trigger event which leads them to conclude that their property is likely to come under attack and it is {\textquoteleft}time to leave{\textquoteright}. It should be noted that that many of these findings based on survivors{\textquoteright} accounts correspond closely with Key findings concerning the bushfire fatalities reported by J. Handmer, S. O{\textquoteright}Neil, and D. Killalea in their report to the 2009 Victorian Bushfires }, url = {http://www.bushfirecrc.com/resources/issues-community-bushfire-safety-analyses-interviews-conducted-2009-victorian-bushfires-re}, author = {Jim McLennan and Elliott, Glenn and Omodei, Mary} } @proceedings {BF-3756, title = {When residents come under imminent wildfire threat, what aspects of decision making distinguish those who stay and defend their home from those who leave?}, year = {2012}, pages = {87-89}, publisher = {IAWF}, abstract = {bushfires (wildfires) occurring on days of extreme fire danger following long periods of low rainfall (Haynes et al 2008). A review of fatalities in disaster-level bushfires suggested that: (1) most deaths occurred when residents fled at the last minute and resulted from either vehicle crash or radiant heat; and (2) many who died in or near houses were elderly or otherwise impaired (Handmer \& Tibbits, 2005). In its 2005 Position Statement the Australasian Fire Authorities Council concluded that: {\textquotedblleft}By extinguishing small ignitions, people of adequate mental, emotional, and physical fitness, equipped with appropriate skills and basic resources can save a building that would otherwise be lost to fire{\textquotedblright} (p 6). These considerations led to a general Australian fire agency community safety policy message to residents at-risk of bushfires to: {\textquoteleft}prepare, stay and defend or leave early{\textquoteright} (Tibbits et al. 2008).}, url = {http://www.iawfonline.org/pdf/3rd\%20Human\%20Dimensions\%20Conference\%20Proceedings\%20-\%20FINAL.pdf}, author = {Jim McLennan and Elliott, Glenn and Omodei, Mary} } @proceedings {BF-3057, title = {Bushfire Survival-Related Decision Making: What the Stress and Performance Research Literature Tells Us}, year = {2011}, month = {2011}, publisher = {Bushfire CRC}, address = {Sydney, Australia}, issn = {978-0-9806759-9-3}, url = {http://www.bushfirecrc.com/resources/pages-307-319-bushfire-survival-related-decision-making}, author = {Jim McLennan and Elliott, Glenn and Omodei, Mary and Ilona M McNeill and Patrick Dunlop and Suss, J} } @proceedings {BF-3055, title = {Capturing Community Members{\textquoteright} Bushfire Experiences: The Lake Clifton (WA) Fire}, year = {2011}, month = {2011}, publisher = {Bushfire CRC}, address = {Sydney, Australia}, issn = {978-0-9806759-9-3}, url = {http://www.bushfirecrc.com/resources/pages-272-277-capturing-community-members-bushfire-experiences-lake-clifton-fire}, author = {Patrick Dunlop and Jim McLennan and Elliott, Glenn and Leanne Kelly and Riseborough, K and Meagan Tyler and Peter Fairbrother} } @article {BF-3138, title = {Community Members{\textquoteright} Decision Making Under the Stress of Imminent Bushfire Threat - Murrindindi Fire}, year = {2011}, month = {July 2011}, institution = {La Trobe University}, abstract = {This is a report of findings from a pilot analysis of three data sets concerning experiences of those affected by the Murrindindi Fire on Saturday, 7 February 2009: (a) 51 transcripts of interviews with survivors conducted by members of the Bushfire CRC Research Taskforce; (b) 15 lay witness statements to the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission; and (c) evidence presented to the Royal Commission concerning the 38 fatalities that occurred on 7 February 2009 as a result of the Murrindindi Fire. The Interim and Final Reports of the Royal Commission were also consulted. There were two aims: First to investigate community members{\textquoteleft} plans, decisions and actions in relation to the Murrindindi Fire. Second, to develop data analysis procedures to apply subsequently to: (i) the complete data set of 608 Taskforce interview transcripts; (ii) the complete data set of approximately 100 Royal Commission lay witness statements; (iii) the evidence presented to the Royal Commission concerning the 173 fatalities resulting from the 7 February 2009 Victorian bushfires. The body of the report describes findings from the pilot study of decision making by community members under imminent bushfire threat. The procedures developed appear to be suitable to apply to the three larger data sets: (i), (ii), and (iii), described above. Ten {\textquoteleft}lessons{\textquoteright} about decision making by community members under imminent bushfire threat emerging from the pilot study are proposed. 1. Lack of accurate, timely, specific, and personally-relevant information about the fire threat undermines sound survival-related decision making. Uncertainty is a major threat to survival. (page 55) 2. Communities influence decision making by individual members via shared, normative, beliefs about bushfire risk. If a majority of community members believe that their community is not at risk, most individuals will be psychologically unready to make sound survival-related decisions under imminent bushfire threat. (page 54) 3. Advice and information from particular {\textunderscore}others{\textquoteleft} will be a major determinant of an individual{\textquoteleft}s decision making{\textemdash}the more so under conditions of uncertainty. Information and advice from close family members, and from people perceived to have bushfire-related expertise (firefighters, SES, police) will be extremely influential. (page 55) 4. What others are observed to be doing is an important determinant of an individual{\textquoteleft}s decision making. People are social beings and take their cues about what to do by noting what others are doing in a given situation{\textemdash}especially a situation characterised by uncertainty. (page 55) 5. Under imminent bushfire threat decision making and action is gendered. Men are more likely to stay and defend their property; women are more likely to leave{\textemdash}especially if they have strong feelings of responsibility for the physical or psychological wellbeing of other family members. (pages 12, 28, 43) 6. Commitment to a bushfire plan may be a path to disaster{\textemdash}especially a plan to stay and defend. Better that any plan is conditional upon specific conditions being met before being implemented, and has fall-back options. (pages 10, 12, 18, 35-39) 7. The legendary {\textunderscore}Murphy{\textquoteleft} was an optimist with regards to bushfires. All involved should be warned to expect and be ready for something really important going seriously wrong at the worst possible time with potentially fatal consequences (page 19, pages 35-39). [The general literature on human factors aspects of safety in hazardous environments suggests that thorough rehearsal and practice of intended actions may offer some protection]. 8. Some individuals should not be in a situation where they are at risk of bushfire attack: people under 18, those aged 70 or more, those with disabilities or other impairments{\textemdash}physical, social, psychological. (Table 3, pages 51-53) 9. In extremis, an individual{\textquoteleft}s ability to: (a) down-regulate negative emotions like fear and anxiety; (b) maintain an attentional focus on emerging threats from the environment; and (c) keep actions coupled tightly to surviving in a potentially lethal environment will largely determine survival. (pages 21-23). 10. For a variety of complex reasons, some individuals will choose to act in ways that jeopardise their safety, and the safety of others. (Table 3, pages 51-53) }, url = {http://www.bushfirecrc.com/resources/community-members-decision-making-under-stress-imminent-bushfire-threat-murrindindi-fire}, author = {Jim McLennan and Elliott, Glenn} } @article {BF-1060, title = {Bushfire weather climatology of the Haines Index in south-western Australia}, journal = {Australian Meteorological Magazine }, volume = {56}, number = {2}, year = {2007}, month = {6/30/2007}, pages = {75-80}, author = {Lachlan W. McCaw and Marchetti, P and Elliott, Glenn and Reader, G} } @article {BF-1303, title = {"The Human Factors Interview Protocol: A Tool for the Investigation of Human Factors Issues in Emergency Management"}, journal = {Australian Journal of Emergency Management}, year = {2007}, author = {Elliott, Glenn and Omodei, Mary and Jim McLennan} } @proceedings {BF-2576, title = {Networked Fire Chief: A Research and Training Tool that Targets the Human Factors Causes of Unsafe Decision Making in Wildfires}, year = {2005}, month = {April 26-28, 2}, address = {Missoula, MT.}, abstract = {A case is presented for the use of computer simulated wildland firefighting scenarios (rather than only relying on field exercises, prescribed burns, and naturally-occurring incidents), for the targeted investigation of underlying causes of unsafe decisions in the context of wildland firefighting. We outline a set of requirements for a computer-based wildland firefighting simulation tool to be adequate for the systematic investigation of human factors underlying safety-compromising decisions. In introducing these requirements, we draw particular attention to: (a) the need to distinguish between the concepts of physical and psychological fidelity in simulation design; and (b) the relative importance of each type of fidelity for investigating human decision making. Networked Fire Chief (Omodei, Taranto and Wearing, 2003) is introduced as a proven research tool for meeting the identified requirements. Networked Fire Chief is a wildland fire fighting scenario generator specifically designed for research into psychological processes involved in decision making under conditions of complexity, time-constraint, risk, and uncertainty. In addition to use in human factors research, the program can also be used to generate training scenarios ranging from training in fire behaviour to training in large scale incident management skills.}, author = {Omodei, Mary and Elliott, Glenn and Matthew Walshe and Wearing, Alexander J.} } @article {BF-1305, title = {Development of Computer Simulated Wildfire Scenarios for the Experimental Investigation of Unsafe Decision Making}, year = {2004}, institution = {Bushfire CRC Enhancing Safety Project (D2.3)}, author = {Omodei, Mary and Elliott, Glenn and Matthew Walshe} }